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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsl\IERL BELWOOD

Case No.
12548

'
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for violation
of Section 76-30-1 and 3 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
Appellant was tried in the District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson presiding, and found guilty of
murder in the first degree.
RELIEF SOEGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower
eourt be affirmed.
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STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The respondent basically agrees with the statement
of facts as submitted by appellant.

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED
TIIE 'V ARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED FOR
THE .ARREST OF APPELLANT AND HIS
SUBSEQUENT ARREST TO BE VALID.
On July 9, 1970, at approximately 2:30 p.m., .Mr.
Peter K. Smith and l\Ir. Howard Warr found the body
of Ronald Paul Smith while they were cutting cedar
posts (T. 113-114). They drove to Tooele and notified
the sheriff ( T. 118). Sheriff Gillette and some of his
deputies accompanied the two men to the scene to investigate (T. 536). The investigation continued until
the next day (T. 408).
During this period, Larry Krish, who testified in
court that on July 8, 1970 from 11 :30-12 :15 he had
been with Bennett M.. Belwood and Ronald Paul Smith
(Tr. 331), was interviewed (T. 409). Oliver L. Eickstaedt, father of Ruth Ruby Breece testified in court
that Bennett M. Belwood and another person on July
9, 1970, picked up Ruth at 2 :00 o'clock in the morning
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and left ( T. 347) . They also took with them a small
"·hite handled gun ( T. 346) . Mr. Eickstaedt and Larry
Krish were interviewed under the direction of Sheriff
Gillette prior to the issuance of the complaint and arrest warrant (T. 408-409).
evidence was collected by Sheriff Gillette
at the scene of the crime. Included were tire markings,
their width, and stump samples with what appeared to
he red paint on them ( T.409).
The width of the tire marks (wheel base) was 4'8",
which indicated the car to be some type of smaller compact, such as a Comet, Falcon, or Chevrolet Corvair
( T. 193) . An investigation was made into the type of
car Bennett I\I. Belwood owned (T. 410), and it was
determined it was red and was a Falcon ( T. 408). Belwood was at Dugway on .T uly 9, 1970 three times at approximately 3 :30 a.m. ( T. 232), 6 :00 a.m. ( T. 238),
and 7 :30 a.m. At 3 :30 a.m. the car Belwood drove was
identified at Dugway as a 1962 Ford Falcon, red body
with a white top, Utah License LS 5561 (T. 232). There
were three occupants in the car at this time; two men
and a \voman ( T. 233-4). At approximately 6 :00 a.m.
Belwood returned to Dugway and the other male passenger was not in the car ( T. 238) . Prior to the issuance
of the complaint and arrest warrant, Sheriff Gillette
had spoken to persons at Dugway with reference to
llelwoocl's heing there on .July 9, 1970 (T. 410). "\Vith

this information, Sheriff Gillette went to the county
attorney to obtain a complaint (T. 393 & 410) and also
testified he had discussed the matter with him at that
time and for several <lays ( T. 393) .
Sheriff Gillette appeared before Judge Marshall
on July 10, 1970 at approximately 2:00 p.m. Judge
.Marshall stated that he had sworn Sheriff Gillette to
the follmYing oath before he signed the complaint ( T.
504).

"You do solemnly swear that the allegations and facts set forth in the complaint of
the State of Utah versus Bennett Merl Belwood and Ruth Ruby Breece are true and
correct according to your best knowledge, information, and belief, so help you God." ( T .
.510).

He did not specifically remember asking any other
questions but he could have done so; he did not recall at
this time ( T. 507).
The complaint was signed by Sheriff Gillette and
a warrant of arrest was issued in conformance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 ( 1953) which states:
"'Vhen a verified complaint is made before a magistrate charging the commission of
a crime or puhlic offense he must, if satisfied
therefrom that the offense complained of has
been committed and that there is reasonable

ground to believe that the accused committed
it, issue a warrant for his arrest... "
Radio contact was made with a peace officer in the
Vernal area ( T. 501) . The license number, make and
model of car, the description and names of the car's occupants, Bennett .l\1erl
and Ruth Ruby Breece
were communicated ( T. 502). The Vernal authorities
were asked to locate the car and the occupants and to
keep it under surveillance until a warrant could be taken over ( T. 502) . Subsequently Sheriff Gillette flew
to Dutch John, Utah, July 10, 1970, arriving at 5 :30
p.m. whereupon he placed Bennett Merl Belwood under
arrest ( T. 535).
The court in the trial of Bennett Merl Belwood,
based upon evidence presented before it made a finding
of fact that the complaint was issued based upon probable cause, and, thereafter the warrant of arrest was
duly issued on the charge before the court ( T. 532) .
Appellant's claim that his arrest was invalid and it
taints any search or seizure that occurred is unsound.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 137, 45 S. Ct. 280,
69 L.Ed. 543 ( 1925) set forth the principle that in the
case of automobiles:
"The right to search and the validity of
the seizure are not dependent on the right to
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable
cause the seizing officer has for belief that
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the contents of the automobile offend against
the law." 267 U.S. at 159.
Reasonable cause or probable cause was defined by the
Court as follmvs:
"If the facts and circumstances before the
officer are such as to warrant a man of pru. dence and caution in believing that the offense
has been committed, it is sufficient." 267 U.S.
at 161.
In Chambers v. illaroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct.
1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the Supreme Court of
the United States held that officers who had information that robbers, carrying guns and fruits of crime,
had fled the scene of the crime in a light blue compact
station wagon carrying four men, one wearing a green
sweater and another wearing a trench coat, did in fact
have probable cause to stop the automobile, and the
search of the automobile later at the station house without a warrant was not improper. The facts of this case
as stated previously compare with the standards of Carroll. Any prudent officer would have had probable
cause to believe a crime had been committed and that
under these circumstances and facts, that Bennett 1\1.
Belwood was suspect. The facts known to Sheriff Gillette go far beyond those known to the officer in Chambers. Therefore, using Chambers as the standard, there
can be no doubt probable cause existed for appellant's
arrest.

7
The trial court did not err in its ruling the warrant
of arrest and appellants arrest to be valid.
POINT IA
APPELLANT 'V AIVED ANY POSSIBLE
DEFECT OF HIS ARREST WHEN HE
PLEAD TO THE INFORMATION vVITHOUT ANY PRIOR OBJECTION THERETO.
Once the appellant was properly before the court
under the information filed against him and his plea
thereto had been entered, any objection defendant had
to his arrest was waived. Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-2
( 1953) provides that the defendant is conclusively presumed to have waived any defect in his case "unless
he shall before pleading to the information or indictment specifically and expressly object to the information or indictment."
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
12, 18 U.C.A. expresses substantially the same procedure.
This court in State v. Warwick, 11 Utah 2d 116,
355 P .2d 703 ( 1960) cited the Utah statute as its authority in a first degree murder case, when it stated
any error was waived.
"Since the defendant pleaded to the information in the district court without first objecting to the information, he is conclusively
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presumed to have wah•ed any defect." 11 Utah
at 119 (Emphasis added).
In the present case, appellant failed to object to
any errors in the arrest warrant before he plead to the
information. Therefore, if there be any errors, they must
be deemed to have been waived. Not only is this reasoning applicable to Utah law, but many other jurisdictions
have in direct appeals, habeas corpus proceedings,
and post conviction proceedings repeatedly held that a
eourt may try a person accused of a crime and that the
legality of the arrest warrant does not affect the guilt
or innocense of an accused nor diYest nor vitiate his conviction once he has plead the information. State v. FI alshell, 81 :\1".l\I. 239, 462 P.2d 518 (1970) and cases cited
therein.
POINT II
PROBABLE CAUSE E X I S T E D TO
SEARCH APPELLAXT'S AUTOl\10BILE AT
THE TIME OF ARREST AXD \\TITH A
SEARCH 'VARRANT AS ISSUED BY A l\fAGISTRATE.
Appellant's suggestions that the search of his automobile and evidence obtained were illegal are totally
unfounded.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
"X o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause su:µported by oath or affirmation,
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and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV."
Sheriff Gillette appeared on July 11, 1970 before
Judge Marshall, the same judge that previously issued
the arrest warrant on July 10, 1970. Judge Marshall
stated that he read the Affidavit and that there may
have been one or two other matters that he asked about
but that he did not recall what they were at the time
( T. 509). The Affidavit clearly stated the place to be
searched, a vehicle described as a white-over-red twodoor sedan, 1962 Ford Falcon, license number LS5561
located at 456 South 525 'iVest, Tooele, Utah ( R-65) .
The items that were to be seized were specifically
enumerated as weapons (small caliber) , bullets, cartridges, blood stains, organic foliage (grass, tree branches, leaves and weeds), paint smearls, soil, hair, tire
tread, blunt instruments, shoes, cigarettes, beer and
clothing.
The Affidavit states the persons suspected of the
crime lived at 456 South 525 \iVest, Tooele, Utah and
were observed there prior to and subsequent to the commission of the felony. Evidence of tire tracks, paint
smears, and damage to the automobile indicated the car
was at the scene of the crime. (R.66)
The Affidavit further states that an all points
pickup order of the suspects and the automobile had
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been ordered whereafter said suspects and automobile
,were apprehended and taken into custody ( R. 66) .
Judge :Marshall knew that the Sheriff had consulted with the County Attorney (R. 66), filed a complaint (R. 69, and had obtained a warrant of arrest (R.
68) from him on .July 10, 1970. Then the Sheriff was
put under oath (T. 510, supra) as is required by Utah
Code Ann. § 77-54-4 ( 1953) which states:
"The magistrate must, before issuing the
warrant, examine on oath the complainant, and
any witnesses he may produce, and take their
depositions in writing, and cause them to be
subscribed by the parties making them."
'Vhereafter, Judge :Marshall being satisfied Sheriff
Gillette's affidavit "set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application, or probable cause
for believing that they exist/' as provided in Utah Code
Ann. § 77-54-5 ( 1953) , issued the search warrant as he
must do in conformance with Utah Code Ann.§ 77-54-6
( 1953) which requires:
"If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied
of the existence of the grounds of the application, or that there is probable cause to believe
their existence, he must issue a search warrant,
signed by him with his official title, to a peace
officer in his county, commanding him forthwith to search the person or place named for

11.

the property specified and to bring it before
the magistrate."
The search warrant was properly issued as pro•:ided by appropriate constitutional and statutory law.
Courts have long distinguished between the search
of an automobile and a home or other building. In Carroll, supra:
"
. the Court held that automobiles and
other conveyances may be searched without a
warrant in circumstances which would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or
an office, provided that there is probable
cause to believe that the car contains articles
that the officers are entitled to seize. The Court
expressed its holding as follows:

"'Ve have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the government,
as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling
house, or other structure in respect of
which a proper official warrant readily
may be obtained and a search of a ship,
motor boat, >vagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable
to secure a warrant, because the vehicle

12

can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought .. , 267 U.S. at 153.
In Cham.be rs, supra, the court stated:
"Arguably because of the preference for
a magistrate's judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a
search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the
"lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is
the "greater" and which the "lesser" intrusion
is itself a debatable question and the answer
may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference
between on the one hand seizing and holding a
car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant.
Given probable cause to search, either course
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
399 U.S. at 51.
In applying this reasoning in Chambers to the facts
of the present case, there can be no doubt the action
taken in searching appellants automobile complied with
the law.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in State
v. Richards, ____ Utah 2d.... , 489 P .2d 422 ( 1971), held
that the warrantless seizure of defendant's truck parked
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across the street from his home, at the time of his arrest
in his home was unreasonable. Officers' justification
for the seizure was the belief that it was involved in
another crime; however, the record was devoid of facts
or circumstances to support the belief and therefore was
unreasonable and did not support a finding of probable
cause. This Court formulated the standard on unreasonableness in the case of State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d
272, 444 P.2d 519 (1968) when it stated:
"The question to be answered is whether
under the circumstances the search or seizure
is one ·which fair-minded persons, knowing the
facts, and giving due consideration to the
rights and interests of the public, as well as to
those of the suspect, would judge to be an unreasonable or oppressive intrusion against the
latter's rights."
This court in Richards, distinguished that case from
Chambers, supra, on the facts and the issue of probable
cause but did note that a vehicle as in Chambers could
be searched on the spot or at the station house because
the probable cause factor and the mobility of the car
still existed. 489 P.2d at 424.

Coolidge v. New I-I ampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 91 S. Ct.
2022, 20 L.Ed. 2d 564 ( 1971), observed that the doctrine in Chambers was applicable whenever the police
would be justified in making a legal contemporaneous

14

search at the time of arrest or they may take it to the
police station and search it.
Recently, in TVhitely v. TVardcn, TVyoming State
Penitentiary, ____ U.S. ____ , 91 S. Ct. 1031 ( 1971), a case
similar to the one at bar, TVhitely challenged the constitutionality of evidence seized during a search incident
to an arrest. The Court held that where the initial impetus for the arrest was an informer's tip, information
gathered by arresting officers can be used to sustain a
finding of probable cause. However, the record in that
case >vas devoid of any information at any stage that
would support either the reliability of the informant or
the informant's conclusion. 91 S.Ct. at 1036.

Richards involved a search of a vehicle not related
to the crime the suspect >ms arrested for and Whitely
involved an unsubstantiated informer's tip.
The present action differs from these cases in that
the search is justified under two theories. First, the
search of the automobile was permissible under the movable vehicle exception in Chambers. The victim was
known to have been with the appellant just prior to his
death as testified to by various persons (T. 331, 408-9,
347), evidence obtained by the sheriff substantiated
the probability that appellant's automobile was at the
scene of the crime, ( T. 409) and the guard at Dugway
testified that appellants were known to be traveling in
the car eastward, possibly to Denver, Colorado ( T. 239).
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Second, a search warrant had been obtained and the car
searched thereafter in accordance with the applicable
laws as stated previously.
This court in adjudicating the reasonableness of
the search and seizure of evidence in Criscola, supra,
stated:
"Due to the responsibility of the trial court
in controlling the admissability of evidence,
and his advantaged position to pass on such
matters, it is his prerogative to make this determination. For those reasons, his ruling
should be indulged with a presumption of correctness and should not be disturbed unless it
clearly appears that he was in error." 21 Utah
2d at 275.
Appellant cites several cases as authority for his
claims. None of the cases cited by appellant are factually similar to the case at bar and the majority if not all
involve the search of a home or person rather than a
vehicle.
The first is Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S.
41, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159 ( 1933). In that case the
affidavit stated that the affiant had "cause to suspect
and (did) believe that certain merchandise" was in the
premises described.
In the case at bar, we are not concerned with an
informer or searching a dwelling as in Nathanson. There
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was nothing in Nathanson, either in the affidavit or in
the other proof introduced at trial, to suggest that any
facts ha<l been brought out to support a reasonable belief or even a suspicion. Accordingly, the Court held
that " ( m) ere af firmance of helief or suspicion is not
enough."
U.S. at 47. But in Fourth Amendment
cases, findings of reasonableness or of probable cause
necessarily rest on the facts and circumstances of each
i1articular case.
The second case appellant relies on is Giordenello
i) .United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.
2d 1503 ( 1958). There the affidavit alleged that "Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, to-wit:
heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importation * * * ." The opinion of the Court, by MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN, after discussing Rules 3 and
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, held
that the defect in the complaint was that it "does not
provide any basis for the Commissioner's determination
under Rule 4 that probable cause existed." 357 U.S. at
4:86. The dissent in the case, in commenting on the
Court's holding that the complaint was invalid, said:
"The Court does not strike down this complaint directly on the l"i'ourth .A.mendment, but merely on an extension of Rnle 4." 357 U.S. at 491.
Giordenello was a narcotic's case governed by federal rules whereas the case before the court involves a
search made pursuant to Utah law.
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In .t1guilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509,

12 I_..Ed.2d 223 ( 1964), the Court dealt v.:ith an Affidavit that stated only:
"Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that
heroin * * * and other narcotics and narcotic
paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and
use contrary to the provisions of the law." 378
U.S. at 109, 84 S.Ct. at 1511.
Again, this is factually distinguishable as was Giordenello.
Finally appellant cites Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 ( 1969),
a narcotics case, in which an informer concluded that
Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation.
None of appellant's foregoing cases are factually
similar or analogous to this action nor do they tend to
establish precedent for the present case. On the contrary,
they point out the stark reality of the difference between the fact situations, and as Nathanson, supra,
stated, "The facts of each case determines whether probable cause exists."
In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223,
228, 13 L ..Ed.2d 142 ( 1964) a case involving the defend:mt's arrest without a warrant for possession of
dearing house slips established that only probability,
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and not a prima f acie shotting of criminal activity is the
standard of probable cause; United States v. Ventrusca.
380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 745, 13 L.Ed.2d 684
( 1965) wherein the court reviewed a warrant issued to
search a house for an illegal distillery stated that in
judging probable cause, issuing magistrates are not to
be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions
on the use of their common sense; ]}[c Gray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 ( 1967)
wherein police officers failed to divulge their informant's name at a preliminary hearing for probable cause
followed the doctrine that affidavits of probable cause
are tested by much less vigorous standards than those
governing the admissiability of evidence at trial; and
the determination of probable cause by magistrates
should be paid great deference by reviewing courts as
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-71, 80 S.Ct.
725, 735-36, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 ( 1960) stated in a case involving the probable cause the authorities had in the
seizure of narcotics.
There was certainly probable cause to arrest the defendant, and to search his car either at the time of the
arrest or with the warrant as issued by the magistrate.
The maaistrate's
actions were proper and his deo
terminations should not be limited but should be paid
great deference by reYiewing courts. In light of the
foregoing discussion of appellant's contentions are meritless.
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POINT III
ANY ERROR THAT l\IAY HAYE BEEN
COl\11\IITTED IN THE ADl\IISSION OF
DENCE FROM THE SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S AUTOMOBILE MUST BE DEEMED
HARMLESS.
l n applying the law as cited in Chambers, in the
case before the bar, the car could have been searched
at Dutch .John, Utah, at the time of arrest without a
search or at the station house at a later time, again without a search warrant. I-Iowever, a search warrant was
obtained, and if there is any error in its procurement it
could only be determined to be non-prejudicial as provided by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (1953) which states:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties. If error has been committed, it
shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it has
that effect before it is warranted in reversing
judgment."
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct.
824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ( 1967) the Supreme Court of the
United States in deciding the issue of harmless error
<leclined to adopt a rule that any constitutional error
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must be deemed harmful. 386 U.S. at 21. The court
f ollmved the law established by Congress, which provi<les:
"On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
rertiorori in any case, the court shall give judgment after examination of the record without
regard to errors or clefects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties." 28
U.S.C.A. § 2111 (1949).
A re\riew of the evidence presented and accepted
by defense counsel proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of the crime, and any evidence entered on the basis of the search and seizure is
consid2red harmless.
On July 8, 1970, Larry Krish had been drinking
with the clefenclant and Ronald Paul Smith from about
11:30 p.m. till 12:15 p.m. (T. 331). They were in a
ForJ Falcon. ( T. 330) At approximately 12 :05 p.m.,
Tony ),Iastronardi, a bartender at Red's Place, sold Ronald Paul Smith a six pack of beer and saw another
person with him ( T 334-5) .
}fr. Oliver L. Erickstaedt, stated at I :30 a.m. on
July 9, 1970, the defendant arrived at his place and was
in his Falcon. He stated that the defendant stated he
ha<l to go out to Dugway to fill out a CA-I form (T
435). l\Ir. Eickstaedt testified that the defendant and
his <law:rhter
searched for and a found a small whiteo
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handled pistol that belonged to his daughter ( T 348) .
J\fr. Eickstaedt testified as to the parts of the gun and
his giving those type of parts to the defendant ( T. 347).
Defendant and Mr. Eickstaedt's daughter (Ruth
"Ruby" Breece) then left with the gun and a third person sitting in the right-hand front seat of the car ( T.
348). At about 2 :00 a.m., July 9, 1970, the defendant
Ruby Breece, and Ronald Smith went to pick up Daniel
J. Maloney ( T 351). Mr . .:Maloney did not go with them
and they left ( T 352). At 3 :20 a.m., July 9, 1970,
defendant and hvo occupants, one a woman and the
other a man, arrived at Dugway Proving Grounds. A
check of the defendant's car, a 1962 Falcon Ford, red
body 'vith a white top, Utah license LE 5561, was recorded ( T 232) . Defendant was also identified by his
driYer' s license ( T 232) . A description of the two other
persons in the car was also given (T 233). Defendant
and the man and woman with him left but did not return
until 6 :00 a.m. the same day. However, only two people
returned, the defendant and the woman (T 238).
On July 9, 1970, Mr. Peter IC Smith and Mr.
Howard 'Varr found the victim's body and reported it
to the sheriff's department (T 117-119). Evidence
found at the scene of the crime included tire tracks with
a wheel base that was identified as coming from a small
compact car such as a Ford Falcon ( T 193) and red
paint smears off a stump which the car had backed into .
.An autopsy of the victim produced bullet fragments
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that were sent to 'Vashington D.C. to be analyzed by
the F.B.I. (T 150-152). James Daniel Beck, an F.B.I.
firearms identification expert testified that the bullet
fragments taken from the victim were fired from a
gun (Exhibit 28) to the exclusion of all others ( T 314316). The gun was identified as the one defendant had
taken with him on July 8, 1970 from .l\Ir. Eickstaedt's
home and also was bought by Ruth Ruby Breece because
defendant could not do so on the basis he had been convicted of a felony (T 174).
The gun had been hurried by defendant. However,
Ruth Ruby Breece led the Sheriff's Department to its
buriel place ( T 399) . On the way to the pass she confirmed the defendant's coming to the home, picking her
up, getting the gun, going to Dugway with her and
Ronald Paul Smith, and the defendant and victim going
off to shoot a deer and the victim never coming back
( T 399-400). The defendant gave a complete confession of the crime and how he had killed Ronald Paul
Smith (T 437-440). The court mled that the confession was given freely and voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt. ( T 533) The defendant in his own testimony
before the court at his trial admitted that he could have
brushed into the trees ( T 573) ; that Ron got out to
help him get unstuck ( T 57 5) ; that he then went to
Dugway ( T 576) ; he left Ron back where he got stuck
( T 576) and that the reason Ron did not go back to Dugway was because he was dead ( T 576) .
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The evidence above clearly shows the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt and any evidence
that may have been obtained through error in the search
was harmless.
This court upheld similar reasoning in the murder
case of State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246
( 1970) when it stated that if the error would have no
effect upon the outcome of the trial, it should not be reversible error. See also; State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d
202, 468 P .2d 639 ( 1970) ; State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah
2<l 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964); State v. Burch, 17 Utah
2d 418, 413 P.2d 805 (1966); State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah
2d 231, 461 p. 2d 297 ( 1969).
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S CONFESSION vV AS
FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN AND
THEREFORE PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AGAINST APPELLANT.
Appellant's claim that his confession ( T. 438-443)
was not valid is erroneous. This court has stated in State
v. Ringo, 14 Utah 2d 49, 377 P.2d 646 ( 1963) that the
question to be determined in admitting a confession into
evidence is its voluntariness. This Court in the case reiterated a previous ruling where it held that a statement
made to an officer while under arrest does not make it
involuntary. Nor did the fact that no warning had been
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given to defendant that what he said could be used
against him make it involuntary. 14 Utah 2d at 81. Appellant's confession was voluntary.
He was arrested on July 10, 1970, at about 5:30
p.m. (2. 363). The confession was given July 12, 1970,
at about 3 :00 p.m. ( T. 369, 381). In that time, appellant had been brought back to Tooele from the place of
arrest and had been placed in the Tooele City Jail ( T.
382). Sheriff Fay Gillette testified that he advised appellant at the time of his arrest in accordance ·with

ftfiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 1966). Appellant
testified he took Valium ( T. 457) . Sheriff Gillette
seized the pills from appellant and checked with Dr. Al<lous who prescribed them ( T. 403) . This was done to
identify the pills before Sheriff Gillette could give him
any ( T. 403) . After this, the appellant was given a pill
approximately 12 hours after his arrest (T. 404). Orders were left with the jailer to give appellant his pills
according to the prescription ( T. 404). Sheriff Gillette
testified that no medication was used to induce appellant
to make a statement ( T. 404) or held from him until a
statement was made. To the contrary, Sheriff Gillette
was acting within the scope of his office at all times.
This Court in State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468
P.2d 639 ( 1970) decided a case where the defendant
had made voluntary statements that he had killed the
victim. This Court in that case held:
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"The purpose that should underlie and
condition all rules relating to the investigation
of crimes and the treatment of suspects should
be to provide a fair, reasonable and practical
means for seeking out the truth and doing
.justice. This should be done ·with civilitv. and
consideration for the suspect, without cruelty,
oppression or imposition. But it is not necessary to lean over so far in that direction as to
put such restrictions on peace officers that they
cannot <lo a thorough and efficient job of investigating crime." 24 Utah 2d at 207.
On July 12, 1970, appellant was brought to Sheriff
Gillette's office with Ruth Breece, and appellant said
he wanted to make a statement. Sheriff Gillette told
appellant he di<l not want him to talk, and that he had
a right to an attorney (T. 370). Appellant was readvised under the Jliranda requirement (T. 370) after
stating that he clid not want an attorney because he did
not trust them and all they did was "take your money"
( T. 370). Sheriff Gillette asked if he understood his
rights and appellant said he did, that he wanted to talk
(T. 371).
Appellant at this point voluntarily waived his
rights as required by Jliranda. There is no requirement
that the police stop a person who states that he wishes
to confess to a crime. 24 Utah 2d at 207. See also State
v. Jiminez, 22 Utah 2d 233, 451 P.2d 583 (1969).
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Sheriff Gillette told appellant he could stop talkmg or discontinue anytime he wishes (T. 391). However, appellant did not stop or wish at any time to have
an attorney present ( T. 372) . Present was Ruth Breece,
appellant, Sheriff Gillette, Dolores Dougherty and
Deputy James Park (T. 332). Appellant was arraigned
on July 13, 1970, before Judge _Marshall (T. 507).
Judge :Marshall was the only magistrate in Tooele during July, 1970 (T. 417). There are no others in the
Southern precinct and his office is not open on Saturdays or Sundays (T. 417-18).
Appellant's mental condition in no way hampered
his ability to understand the nature and seriousness of
the charges against him ( T. 469) . Dr. Louis G. _Moench,
1\1.D .. a psychiatrist, examined the appellant and stated
the appellant knew the difference between right and
wrong, both morally and legally. Dr. Eugene L. Bliss,
l\I.D., a psychiatrist also examined the appellant and
found him to be sane, to know right from wrong, and
that he was not suffering from any major phychiatric
syndrome ( T. 659-660) .
It is clear from the facts above stated that appel-

lant was aware of his rights; was not threatened or
coerced; was aware of the police techniques because this
was not his first offense, and neither his health nor his
mental condition precluded him from making a free and
voluntary confession. The trial court correctly found
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the confession to be free and voluntary as a finding of
fact ( T ..532-533).
This court in Scandrett recognized it was the trial
court's prerogative to determine:

'T'V ]hether the defendant in awareness
of his rights, and in circumstances where he
was free to choose, voluntarily waived his right
to remain silent and to have counsel." 24 Utah
2d at 207.
Appellant alleges the confession was tainted because of an illegal arrest. First, the arrest was not illegal. However, assuming arguendo that it was, the law
is very clear on this point. This Court in State v. Riojas,
17 Utah 2d 146, 413 P.2d 804 (1966) held that the defendant's arrest, without probable cause, was immaterial
to the admissibility of his statements at the time of his
alleged arrest.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in H olling,11worth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963),
<lecicled a case similar to the present action. The defense
there urged that defendant's confession was tainted by
an asserted illegal arrest. However, the court stated:
"The fact that a confession was obtained
durina
such custodv
and the attendant circum1'.'.>
•
stances should he considered in determining
whether the confession was voluntary, but vol-
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untariness still remains as the test of admissibility." 321 F.2d at 350.
The same conclusion \Vas reached in Brinegar v.
United States, 165 F .2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947), aff. 338
U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 ( 1949) wherein the court stated:
" 'The mere questioning of a suspect while
in the custody of police officers is not prohibited either as a matter of common law or due
process.' Neither will the fact that the arrest,
under which the person \Vas taken into custody,
was illegal, in and of itself render a confession
or an incriminating statement involuntary. The
test is ·whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the confession or incriminating statement was voluntarily made." 165 F.2d 515.
Appellant relies upon the case of Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d
441 ( 1963) to sustain his allegations that the statements
made after the alleged illegal arrest were tainted.
The court in United States v. Close, 349 F.2d 841
(4th Cir. 1965) construed:
""\Vong Sun as holding, in effect, that not
all oral statements are the fruit of the "poisonous tree" simply because they would not have
been made but for the illegal actions of the
police. We think the Court in 'Vong Sun,

29
clearly indicates the view that a statement
which is shown to have been freely and voluntarily made without coercion, either physical or
psychological, may be thereby purged of any
stigma of illegality and the statement is admissible. As we read the decisions of certain other
courts, we conclude that they have so interpreted the Court's indicated view in Wong
Sun. See: Rogers v. U nitcd States, 330 F .2d
535 ( 5 Cir. 1964); Burke v. United States, 328
F.2d 399 (1 Cir. 1964); Hollingsworth v.
United States, 321F.2d312 (10 Cir. 1963)".
349 F .2d at 851.
Utah has taken this viewpoint as stated in Riojas.
There this Court was very explicit in stating that Wong
Sun was so far removed from the facts of the case that
it was of little assistance. 24 Utah 2d at 147.
Even if the arrest had been illegal, the confession
being voluntarily made would still be admissible.
Appellant further advances concepts that are not
applicable to the case at bar. There was not a violation
of the appellant's rights due to his not being arraigned
until l\Ionday.
In State v. Hart, 15 Utah 2d 395, 393 F.2d 487
( 1964), this Court held that where defendant was arrested on Sunday and not taken before a magistrate
until _Monday, that the confession, voluntarily given,
was not rendered inadmissible because it was obtained
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prior to the time the accused \ms taken before a maaist-.
trate. The court further stated that even if there had
been unnecessary delay, the confession would still he
admissible unless the delay had some causitive effect on
the confession. See State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230
P.2d 559 ( 1951) ; Osborn v. l l arris, 115 Utah 204, 203
P.2d 917 ( 1949) ; Jtlares v. I-I ill, 118 Utah 848, 222
P.2d 811 (1950); and State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450,
229 P.2d 289 ( 1951) for holding consonant with Ilart.
There is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes unnecessary delay for exclusion. Jf/ alton v. United
States, 334 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1964). In one case the
defenuant was booked for car theft and vagrancy on
_l\larch 6, 1966. During the afternoon of _l\Iarch 7th he
was interrogated and confessed. On _l\Iarch 8th the defendant was taken before a commissioner. Defense
counsel claimed the delay was unreasonable under Rule
5, Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.;
however the court held it was not unreasonable. JJI arolesGomez v. United States, 371 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1967).
The purpose of Rule 5 is to prevent prearraignment
detention of arrested person for the purpose of securing a confession. However, there is an exception to the
applicability of Rule 5, to arrested persons in state
custody for the simple reason that persons cannot be
conveniently arraigned while in state custody. United
States v. Chad'l.cick, 415F.2d167 (10th Cir. 1969). The

31

rule applies in federal cases and is not binding upon the
states as appellant admits on page 53 of his brief.
Appellant also asks this court to apply the McN abb-J\Iallory doctrine to this case. The McNabb-Mal-

lory doctrine as cited in Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d
863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) is:
"A confession is inadmissible if made
during illegal detention due to failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing
magistrate. The heart of the doctrine is a delay under federal detention-not merely delay
but delay during detention. The purpose of the
doctrine is to require federal officers, over
whom the court has supervisory power (the
doctrine is not a constitutional principle) , to
obey a Rule. The remedy provided by the McNabb line of cases is applicable to confessions
made while a federal officer is illegally withholding a prisoner from presentment." 342
F.2d at 876.
In the case at bar, as Jones, there was no holding in
custody by any federal or District of Columbia officer
at the time the confession was made. Appellant in this
case was in the custody of a Utah Sheriff under a serious charge of a Utah law. Again this doctrine is not
applicable to the states and appellants so state in their
brief on page 53.
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Appellant's contentions are meritless in light of a
legal arrest, a free and voluntary confession and applicable law sustaining actions taken by various authorities
in bringing the appellant to justice.
POINT V
TIIE TRIAL PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE
OF APPELLANT AS
IT DID.
Appellant took the witness stand and testified concerning his mental condition, medication he took and
how much beer he had drunk ( T. 554-556) .
The prosecutor cross-examined the appellant concerning the use of medication ( T. 559-561). Therein
appellant testified that he had taken about three or four
pills on July 8. The appellant further testified as follows:
THE WITNESS: The day I got my keys locked
up in the car, that was-if that was July 8th, I took
three or four.
Q.

(by Mr. Banks) What time?

A.

Approximately four or five.

Q.

What?

A.

Approximately four or five.
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A.M. or P.M.?
A.

In the evening.

Q.

You only took one at a time; isn't that right?

A.

No. I took three or four together.

q. You never did that before, did you?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Now, all this did was relax your muscles a
little bit, didn't it?

A.

More than a little bit.

Q.

And calmed you down a little bit?

A.

More than a little bit.

Q.

What?

A.

More than a little bit.

Q. But that is the purpose for what you took this,
was to calm you clown a little bit, wasn't it?
A.

In some cases for that reason, yes.

Q. And when you took this, you didn't have any
trouble thinking, did you?

'V

Q.
ell, you had been taking this for quite some
time, hadn't you?

A.

Approximately two to three years.

Q.

Yes. And that didn't hurt your thinking pro-
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cesses at any time when you took this, did it?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right, in what way?

A.

\\r ell, it makes things seem sort of unreal.

Q.

How?

A.

Like you're drunk.

Q.

A little fuzzy?

A. :More than a little fuzzy if you take three or
four at a time.

Q. After you took these, you decided to go out
and have a party, didn't you, drink a few beers?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And it didn't impair your memory to the point
you couldn't remember having twenty that night, twenty cans of beer that night, did it?

A.

No, sir.

Q. And you remember going out to Dugway at
about 3 :00 o'clock in the morning, don't you, and checking in at the gate?
A. I said it affected my memory. I didn't say
what extent it did.
.MR. VAN SCIVER: Your Honor, I'm going
to object to that question. That goes beyond the scope
of direct.
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The objection was overruled and cross-examination
continued concerning the effect of the medication and
beer on appellant's memory and his mental state of
mind. In order for the prosecution to properly refute
appellant's contentions that his memory was affected,
it was necessary to review the activities on July 8th. This
was well within the scope of cross-examination allowable
to the prosecutor.
It is a well-settled principal of law that the right
to cro'>s-examine is fundamental to our system of justice
and is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405, 85
S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).
Utah law recognized this right long before Pointer
was decided. In the case of State v. Zolentakis, 70 Utah
296, 269 P. 1044 ( 1927) this court stated:
"In a judicial investigation the right of crossexamination is an absolute right and not a
mere privilege of the party against whom the
witness is called. It is only after such right has
been substantially and fairly exercised that the
allowance of further cross-examination becomes discretionary. 5 Jones, Comm. Ev. § 821.
The reason for the rule is doubtless the fact
that the cross-examination of a witness may not
only modify and explain, but it may destroy
the evidence in chief. A court is unable in advance to determine what will be the result of
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cross-examination in a given case. Legal procedure requires that the court hears before it
condemns, and in such hearing cross-examination is often as enlightening as is the examination in chief." 259 P. at 1047.
This principal of law was reiterated in State v.
Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936) wherein
the court stated:

". . . We think the matter (cross-examina tion) should be left to the sound discretion
of the court and do not intend to lay down any
rule that under no circumstances can the defendant like any other witness be questioned as
to his acts, criminal or otherwise.... " 64 P .2d
at 239. (Emphasis added.)
The judge is the person who has the final responsibility for conducting the trial. He should be allowed
considerable latitude of discretion with respect to the
mechanics of procedure. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah
2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 ( 1960).
Appellant has failed to show the cross-examination
was not within the scope allowable under the court's discretion. Instead, appellant uses pre-code case law to
try to limit the court's discretionary powers.
First, is State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865
( 1905). The court held that it was reversible error to
permit the state to cross-examine the defendant concern-

mg previous crimes which were m no way connected
"·ith the issue before the court. However, Utah state
Lnv and applicable case law now pe mit cross-examination of defendant concerning previous felonies. See

State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 ( 1963)
wherein the court stated:
"\Vhen an accused voluntarily takes the
witness stand he may be asked whether or not
he has even been convicted of a felony. Such
a question is sanctioned by statute. If the accused answers in the affirmative he may be
asked the nature of the felony. Further, the
accused may be asked if he has been convicted
of more than one felony, and if so the type
and nature thereof." 382 P.2d at 409.
Second, in State v. Vance, 28 Utah 1, llO P. 434
( 1910), the court did not rule upon any possible error
iu the cross-examination but reversed the case on other
grounds, 110 P. at 449.
The first case has been changed by statutory law
and the second did not rule directly upon the issue of
cross-examination. These cases are not applicable to the
case before the court. Appellant's contention is groundless and the trial court correctly used its discretion in allowing the prosecutor the latitude it did in cross-examination.
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POINT VI
JURORS WHO WERE OPPOSED TO THE
DEATII PENALTY vVERE NOT ARBITRARILY EXCLUDED FROM PETITIONER'S
TRIAL.
Appellant relies upon UTitherspoon v. United
States, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 726
( 1968) as his basis of appeal. In f¥itherspoon the defendant was charged with the murder of a policeman.
The prosecution utilized an Illinois statute to challenge
for cause 47 of the 96 prospective jurors, who on voir
dire demonstrated opposition to capital punishment or
had scruples against inflicting it. However, no interrogation of the veniremen was undertaken to ascertain
whether their scruples would invariably compel them to
vote against capital punishment.
The case at bar is distinguishable on the facts. Mrs.
l\:Iaass was questioned at some length concerning her
scruples against the death penalty (T. 59-62). Mrs.
l\faas was asked this final question:
"If you believed that the evidence showed a
defendant to be guilty of murder in the first
degree beyond a reasonable doubt, and you
knew that the judge might not follow a recomendation of leniency, rather than returning
a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, would you return a verdict of guilty of
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murder in the second degree because you knew
that that took it out of the judge's hands?"
J\/Irs. :Maas answered "yes."
The extensive interrogation plus her unreserved
answer of "yes" to the final question positively shows
:\1rs. Maass would vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to evidence that might be
developed at the trial. This was not a general objection,
as in 1¥ithcrspoon, but one so prejudiced that it would
destroy the neutrality requirement of TVitherspoon.
In addition to this, the court in Witherspoon did
not address itself to the issue of whether or not deathqualified jurors could be excused if their biasness would
prohibit an impartial finding on the guilt-innocence
issue.
Under Utah law, a challenge for implied bias may
he taken:
"If the offense charged is punishable with
death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions as pre chide (the juror's) finding the
defendant guilty, in which case he must
neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as
a juror." (Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-30-19 ( 9) ( 1953) .
This is substantially different than the Illinois
statute cited above. Under Utah law, mere conscientious
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scruples is not enough to challenge a prospective juror.
The bias must be sufficiently strong so as to "preclude
(the juror's) finding the defendant guilty." This standard appears to be in harmony ,\·ith TVitherspaan, although this specific issue was not discussed in that case
as mentioned above.
Hm,·ever, the X evada Supreme Court has ruled
precisely on this point in Haward v. State, 446 P. 2d
163 (Xev. 1968). 'Vhen this case was tried, Nevada
had an exclusion statute identical to the -Utah statute
cited above.
The defendant, on appeal, alleged error in challenging prospective jurors ·with scruples in light of the
TVitlzerspoan case. The Court upheld the defendants'
com·iction and resolved the point on appeal by saying:
" ... the rationale of TVithcrspaan is inapposite
to the X evada statute since the statutory purpose is to disqualify jurors v:hose opinions
against the death penalty would preclude their
finding the defendant guilty. The Illinois
statute considered in TVithcrspaan did not invoke the right to challenge nor cause those
prospective jurors who stated that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision
as to the defendant's guilt." 466 P. 2d at 16.3.

t'.

The Nevada Court affirmed this position in Barnes
State, 450 P. 2d 1.50 ( N c''. l 9G!J) .
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This court in the case of State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah
2d 2Hl, -l<Gl P.2d 297 (1969), decided the same exact

issue before the court now. The court held the question
aske<l by the trial judge in his voir dire examination:
"* * * Since this offense is punishable by death,
if these men should be convicted of the crime
of first degree murder, do any of you jurors
entertain such conscientious opinions about the
death penalty as would preclude you[r] finding guilty irrespective of how strong the evidence may be concerning guilty?***" 461 P.
2d at 303.
complied with the statutory provlSlons of Utah Code
Ann. 77-30-19 ( 9) ( 1953). This court further added
that the statute complies with the second exclusion of
footnote 21 of JVitherspoon, supra, wherein the court
stated:
"* * * \\Te repeat, however, that nothing we say
today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury
from which the only veniremen who were in
fact excluded for cause were those who made
it unmistakably clear ( 1) that they would
automatically vote against the imposition of
capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of
the case before them, or ( 2) that their attitude
toward the death penalty would prevent them
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from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. * * *" 461 P.2d at 303.
In view of the foregoing, the real issue is whether
or not persons challenged for cause, and excused, were
on the grounds that their scruples against capital punishment would prevent them from being impartial on
the guilt-innocence issue or merely because they voiced
some objection to the death penalty without further inquiry. The lower court voir dire dialogue as quoted by
the petitioners in their brief clearly supports the conclusion that excluded jurors were excused because they
could not be impartial on the guilt-innocence issue and
not because they were simply opposed to capital punishment. This conclusion comports with the T¥itherspoon
standard and thus is not grounds for petitioner's appeal
from the lower courts judgment.
Under the facts of this case and applicable statutory law, there can be no way the exclusion of prospective juror number 22 was erronerous.

POINT VII
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR
COl\iMITTED BY THE P R 0 S E C U T I 0 N
'iVHEN HE REFERRED TO THE CONFESSION IN THE OPENING AND CLOSING
ARGU1\1ENTS.
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The purpose of an opening statement was announcecl in the case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
120 P.2d 285 (1941). In this case the defendant conternled that the district attorney was guilty of misconduct during the trial, and in his final argument to the
jury. The court stated:
"The purpose of an opening statement is to
advise the jury of the facts relied upon and of
the questions and issues involved, which the
jury will have to determine, and to give them a
general picture of the facts and the situations,
so that they will be able to understand the evidence. Counsel should outline generally what
he intends to prove, and should be allowed considerable latitude. He should make a fair statement of the evidence, and the extent to which
he may go is largely in the discretion of the
trial court."
The court went on to add that the jury had been
instructed that they should not consider the opening
and closing statements as evidence, and that most of
the incompetent statements recited were not important
in the chain of evidence but were merely connecting
statements. This was held not prejudicial to the defendant, 120 P.2d at 313.
It is not error to refer to any portion of a confession. Contrary to this, it may be error to exclude any
portion of it as cited by the court in People v. Crowl, 82
P .2d 507 (Cal. 1938). The court stated that when a

confession is entered into evidence the whole on the
subject may be entered into.
The court added that:
"'Vhere the admission or confession of a
party is resorted to exclude any portion of it
made at the same time as the part which is related."
Some courts make an exception to this and allow immaterial and irrelevant portions to be excluded at the
discretion of the court. 82 P.2d at 512.
The case at bar has conformed clearly and concisely
with these aforementioned principles of law.
The prosecution did not violate the standard of
the court as stated in Erwin, supra. The jury had been
properly instructed by the prosecutor himself that his
remarks were not evidence ( T. 108) ; the remarks were
part of the free and voluntary confession of the defendant; and the entire confession was admitted into
evidence at the court's discretion. Even if the opening
statements had gone beyond the normal limits, they
were not unduly prejudicial and would have to be considered harmless under Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
( 1953), supra.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that proper procedure was
fallowed in the arrest of appellant and even if there

had been error, it was waived when appellant failed to
object to the information filed against him. There was
probable cause to search appellant's car but even if any
error were committed, it must be deemed harmless. Appellant's confession was freely and voluntarily given
an<l any referral to it by prosecution in his opening and
closing arguments was proper. The trial court properly
exercised its discretion in allowing the cross-examination of appellant as it did. Juror number 22 (Mrs.
Maass) was not erroneously excluded from petitioner's
trial.
In light of the foregoing argument substantiating
these points, appellant's appeal should not be granted.
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